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PATENT SECRECY ORDERS: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF
INTERFERENCE IN CIVILIAN
CRYPTOGRAPHY UNDER PRESENT
PROCEDURES
Lee Ann Gilbert*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article examines government interference with re-
search through the issuance of secrecy orders on patent appli-
cations. Such interferences have historically been at the rate
of two to three hundred per year; however, the number of se-
crecy orders issued annually appears to be declining.' Foreign
patent applications account for roughly one quarter of the ap-
plications placed under secrecy orders. Of the remaining pat-
ent applications which are placed under secrecy orders, only
one-fifth are for non-government funded inventions. Thus,
roughly fifteen percent of all secrecy orders are issued on pat-
ent applications from domestic sources for privately funded
inventions."
A secrecy order is an order to freeze the examination of a
patent application which is issued by the Commissioner of
Patents under the authority of the Secrecy Order Statute.'
O 1982 by Lee Ann Gilbert.
* Research Attorney, Superior Court of Santa Clara County, Civil and Appellate
Divisions; B.A., 1974, Rice University; J.D., 1981, University of Santa Clara; Member,
California Bar.
1. 292 secrecy orders were issued in 1978, followed by 241 in 1979. Sanders,Data Privacy: What Washington Doesn't Want You To Know, REASON, 25, 35 (Jan.
1981); H.R. RFa. No. 1540, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1980) (hereinafter REPoRT);
The Classification of Private Ideas: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (Feb. 28, March 20, and
Aug. 21, 1980) (Testimony of Rene D. Tegtmeyer) at 2 (hereinafter Hearings).
2. Sanders, supra note 1, at 25, 35. This 15% figure was derived from two years
of data, but it is indicative of the current trend.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1976). The Secrecy Order Statute is one section of the In-
vention Secrecy Act. See infra note 7. The Secrecy Order Statute provides:
Whenever publication or disclosure by the grant of a patent on an
invention in which the Government has a property interest might, in the
opinion of the head of the interested Government agency, be detrimen-
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The order often causes a patent to be temporarily withheld,
and further requires that the invention be kept secret. The
tal to the national security, the Commissioner upon being so notified
shall order that the invention be kept secret and shall withhold the
grant of a patent therefor under the conditions set forth hereinafter.
Whenever the publication or disclosure of an invention by the
granting of a patent, in which the Government does not have a property
interest, might, in the opinion of the Commissioner, be detrimental to
the national security, he shall make the application for patent in which
such invention is disclosed available for inspection to the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Secretary of Defense, and the chief officer of any other
department or agency of the Government designated by the President as
a defense agency of the United States.
Each individual to whom the application is disclosed shall sign a
dated acknowledgement thereof, which acknowledgement shall be en-
tered in the file of the application. If, in the opinion of the Atomic En-
ergy Commission, the Secretary of a Defense Department, or the chief
officer of another department or agency so designated, the publication or
disclosure of the invention by the granting of a patent therefor would be
detrimental to the national security, the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Secretary of a Defense Department, or such other chief officer shall
notify the Commissioner and the Commissioner shall order that the in-
vention be kept secret and shall withhold the grant of a patent for such
period as the national interest requires, and notify the applicant thereof.
Upon proper showing by the head of the department or agency who
caused the secrecy order to be issued that the examination of the appli-
cation might jeopardize the national interest, the Commissioner shall
thereupon maintain the application in a sealed condition and notify the
applicant thereof. The owner of an application which has been placed
under a secrecy order shall have a right to appeal from the order to the
Secretary of Commerce under rules prescribed by him.
An invention shall not be ordered kept secret and the grant of a
patent withheld for a period of more than one year. The Commissioner
shall renew the order at the end thereof, or at the end of any renewal
period, for additional periods of one year upon notification by the head
of the department or the chief officer of the agency who caused the or-
der to be issued that an affirmative determination has been made that
the national interest continues so to require. An order in effect, or is-
sued, during a time when the United States is at war, shall remain in
effect for the duration of hostilities and one year following cessation of
hostilities. An order in effect, or issued, during a national emergency
declared by the President shall remain in effect for the duration of the
national emergency and six months thereafter. The Commissioner may
rescind any order upon notification by the heads of the department and
the chief officers of the agencies who caused the order to be issued that
the publication or disclosure of the invention is no longer deemed detri-
mental to the national security.
Chapter 17 of the Patent Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 805 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188
(1976)) is itself sometimes referred to as the Invention Secrecy Act because it was
based on the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951. Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239
n.1 (1980).
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statute authorizes penal sanctions for violations of an order.'
During the past four years, the government's conduct has
indicated a strong interest in the blossoming field of civilian
data security technology. Government agencies have charac-
terized their conduct in terms of efforts to control a civilian's
ability to decipher secret codes or create unbreakable ones.
Three specific instances of government interference are evi-
dence of this new interest in civilian cryptography.5 Of these
three instances, two involve secrecy orders issued on patent
applications, one of which was issued on a privately funded
invention.
4. Id.
5. For the purposes of this paper, "civilian cryptography" means bode-making
and code-breaking by people who are neither government employees nor employees of
government contractors. The prototype of a civilian cryptographer is the inventor
who invests his own time, money and materials to develop his invention, or to carry
on cryptography. Another instance of civilian cryptography is the university re-
searcher, either a professor, a graduate student or an employee of the university,
whose work is sponsored by the university without government funding. The univer-
sity researcher whose work is funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF)
presents a hybrid case. Whether the publicly funded researcher's work is "civilian" or
governmental depends on whether funding is viewed as "public" or as government.
42 U.S.C. § 1870(e) (1976) allows the NSF to acquire patent ownership or rights
by purchase, lease, loan, gift or condemnation. The NSF exercises this right by pro-
viding, in its loan, grant, or fellowship award contract a clause which vests at least:
(1) a nonexclusive, nontransferrable, paid-up license to make, use, and sell the inven-
tion; (2) the right to sublicense to any foreign government pursuant to treaty require-
ments; (3) the principal or exclusive rights to the invention, or rights to acquire the
same, in any country in which the patentee does not elect to secure a patent; and (4)
the right to require the granting of licenses to certain persons. 45 C.F.R. §§ 650.1-
650.10 (1979). It is important to notice that the major objective of the NSF is to
encourage availability of inventions to the public which arise from NSF-sponsored
activities. Id. at § 650.11 (a). Therefore, NSF funding, while literally government
funding, has a purpose which is more oriented to the public than government con-
tracts. Where the NSF award contract includes the proper terms, however, the NSF
may take the resultant invention by eminent domain. Therefore, the purpose of the
funding is not always public.
6. Kahn, Cryptology Goes Public, 58 FOREIGN AiF. 141, 154-56 (1979). Kahn, ajournalist and author of scholarly historical studies of military uses of cryptography,
reported three specific instances of recent government interference in civilian data
security cryptology.
The first involved a letter written by a National Security Agency (NSA) em-
ployee, J. A. Meyer, to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
which warned that the Institute's upcoming conference to be held at Cornell Univer-
sity in October 1977, and the articles on cryptology that the IEEE had published
might be in violation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). See 22
C.F.R. §§ 121-28 (1979). These regulations applied to "speech scramblers, privacy de-
vices, cryptographic devices," and "technical data" of certain defined types on the
United States Munitions List. The President controls the import and export of the
devices and data. Id. § 121.01, Categories XIII(b) and XVIII; § 123.38, § 125.11. How-
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
On April 21, 1978, the Commissioner of Patents, on the
advice of the National Security Agency (NSA), issued a se-
crecy order on an application for a patent on a
"Phasorphone," a voice scrambling device. The device was
designed by four west coast men and originally was designed
to allow telephone users to talk without being overheard by
electronic eavesdroppers. This secrecy order was issued near
the end of the six month period during which the government
may review an application for national security problems. If
no secrecy order had issued, these inventors would have been
able to apply for, without first securing a license, foreign pat-
ents at the end of the six month period. However, the order
was issued, and the inventors took their plight to the media,
charging violations of privacy, free speech, and due process.
After repeated attempts at negotiations between the inventors
and the various administrative agencies, the NSA allowed the
Patent Office to lift the secrecy order on October 11, 1978.
The application process was resumed, and a patent, number
4,188,580, was issued on February 12, 1980.8
The "Phasorphone" inventors experienced the problems
inherent in current procedures. They were forced to operate
ever, James D. Hathaway, Deputy Director of the Office of Munitions Control at the
State Department, commented that Meyer's interpretation of the applicability of
ITAR to the conference and the conference papers "sounded inaccurate." Shapely &
Kolata, Cryptology: Scientists Puzzled Over Threat to Open Research Publication,
197 Sci. 1345, 1348 (1977).
Another episode involved a patent on a cipher device, applied for by Dr. George
I. Davida, professor of electrical engineering and computer science at the University
of Wisconsin, at Milwaukee. The cipher device provided a method of safeguarding
computer data, using advanced mathematical techniques. The Commissioner of Pat-
ents, on the advice of the NSA, issued a secrecy order on the application on April 21,
1978. The order required that the invention be kept secret in the interest of national
security. The University of Wisconsin's chancellor took the incident to the media,
arguing that the secrecy order had "a chilling effect on academic freedom." See N.Y.
Times, June 13, 1978, § A, at 16, col. 1. Admiral Inman, Director of the NSA, coun-
tered that seeking a patent was evidence of a profit motive rather than an interest in
academic freedom. However, within seven weeks from the issuance, the Patent Office
lifted the secrecy order without explanation. See New York Times, May 31, 1978, § A
at 1, col. 1; Browne, Cryptography Is Too Good for Anyone's Comfort, N.Y. Times,
June 4, 1978, § E, at 7, col. 2; N.Y. Times, June 13, 1978, § A, at 16, col. 1.
The same day on which the secrecy order was issued on Dr. Davida's invention,
the Commissioner of Patents issued another secrecy order on an application for a
patent on a "Phasorphone" voice scrambling device. See San Jose Mercury News,
Feb. 17, 1980, § A, at 2, col. 2-4.
7. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 184-85 (1976).
8. San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 17, 1980, § A, at 2, col. 2-4.
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under a secrecy order for a period, they petitioned for a rescis-
sion of that order, and negotiated with the various agencies
involved to have the order lifted. This article isolates the con-
stitutional torts that a patent applicant might suffer under
current procedures for issuance of a secrecy order. Generally,
the secrecy order acts as a prior restraint on the applicant's
first amendment freedom to publish. Such a prior restraint on
publication has many indicia of a taking of private property
for a public purpose which necessitates government compen-
sation for the value of the property. Many applicants, how-
ever, are denied the right to seek such constitutionally man-
dated compensation, and thereby are denied their due process
rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
After identifying the basic problems with the current
statutes and rules, this. article will discuss the various proce-
dures for seeking review and redress. The article will then
suggest proper interpretations of the existing laws to cure pre-
sent anomolies, and propose amendments to the existing law
and procedural rules. These proposals would make the laws
and procedures consistent with the requirements of the Con-
stitution and protect patent applicatants from manipulation
by various defense agencies.
II. THE INVENTION SECRECY ACT
A. Background and Purpose
The purpose of the patent system in the United States
Constitution is to encourage individuals to expend time, en-
ergy, and resources in pursuit of technological progress.' The
general policy behind the patent system is to award a limited
monopoly to the inventor in return for the full disclosure of
his new, useful, and nonobvious discovery. There are two limi-
tations to this general policy. First, an inventor may not re-
ceive a patent for public information. This restriction is im-
plicit in the concept of invention, and has been broadly
upheld by the courts. 10 Nor will the government issue a pat-
9. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. "The Congress shall have Power ... To promote
the Progress of Science and Useful arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
10. Anderson-Black Rock Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co. Inc., 396 U.S. 57 (1969);
Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966);
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147
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ent on information which, if disclosed, would be detrimental
to the national security. This second restriction was codified
in the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 (the Act).11
A basic purpose of the Act was to allow the government,
in times of peace, as well as in times of war, to prevent the
dissemination of information contained in patent applications
whenever the disclosure of such information would be detri-
mental to the national security." In 1951, the focus of Con-
gress and the Department of Defense was on "inventions use-
ful in war,"18 but the current focus of the Department of
Defense and other agencies is broader.1'
The* Secrecy Order Statute" provides the mechanism for
preventing this dissemination of information. The statute au-
thorizes the Commissioner of Patents to issue secrecy orders
when there is a threat to national security. The issuance of a
secrecy order causes the patent to be withheld, sometimes
causes the application to be sealed and examination of the ap-
plication to cease, and orders that the invention remain secret
under threat of criminal sanctions of a fine of up to $10,000,
or imprisonment up to two years, or both." The Patent Office
can declare the patent abandoned if the terms of the secrecy
order are violated.17
(1950); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1882); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood 52 U.S.
248 (1850); Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).
11. Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-256, 66 Stat. 3 (1951) (based
on 35 U.S.C. §§ 151-158 (1946) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-187 (1976) and 35
U.S.C.A. § 188 (West Supp. 1980)).
12. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1958). See REPORT, supra
note 1, at 57-61. Although the Act was passed during a time of national emergency, it
was intended to apply in times of peace as well. The Subcommittee reviewing the Act
reserved for future consideration the procedures that should apply in peacetime. Id.
at 57.
13. S. REP. No. 1001, 82nd Cong., 2d Seass. 1, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 132, 1323-24. However, Congress expressed concern that inven-
tions made in peacetime were equally important, because such inventions could be
useful in war. Id. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 57-61.
14. REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. Current procedures allow continuation of a se-
crecy order, without justification, until it is revoked. This extends to applications
which are not patentable.
15. See supra note 3.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 186 (1976).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 182 (1976).
[Vol. 22330
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B. Mechanics of the Secrecy Order
1. Generally
The Patent Office interprets the Act as obligating the
Patent Office to recognize applications in which defense agen-
cies will claim a national security interest, and to make such
applications available to the defense agencies."0 If the govern-
ment claims a property interest, the Patent Office will assume
additional duties.
Where the government claims a property interest in an
invention, the interested agency must notify the Commis-
sioner of Patents that the invention should be kept secret."
The government may claim a property interest under either
the Atomic Energy Act (AEA)' 0 or the National Aeronautics
and Space Act (NASA) . 1  The Patent Office recognizes no
other statutes as providing the basis for a government prop-
erty interest.22 All patent applications are screened by the
Patent Office security group, Group 220,'8 to determine which
18. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAM-
INING PROCEDURE §§ 107, 107.01 (3d perm. ed. rev. Oct. 1980).
19. Id.
20. ' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2457-58 (1976).
22. This conclusion is based on silence in the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE as to other statutory bases for a governmental property interest. Tele-
phone interview with Samuel Engle, Patent Office Examiner for Art Unit 221 (Mar. 5,
1980). Mr. Engle is an examiner for Group 220.
23. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 18, at § 107.01.
This section provides:
Under 35 U.S.C. 181 the obligation is directly on the Patent and
Trademark Office to appreciate the possible interest of the defense
agencies in pending applications and to take steps to make them availa-
ble to such agencies.
All new applications received in the Patent and Trademark Office
are screened by Group 220 personnel to determine which applications
should be made available for review or treated under Atomic Energy
and Space Acts for property interests.
All papers subsequently filed must be inspected by the examiner to
determine whether matter of an obvious defense interest which requires
a security review or matters of obvious property right interest under the
Atomic Energy or Space Acts has been introduced into the application.
In such applications forwarded to the Licensing and Review Section of
Group 220, it is helpful if a check mark is placed in the margin opposite
to the part which is significant in suggesting security review.
Applications in Group 220 for the review thereof by the appropriate
defense agency may be borrowed by the examiner when reached for ac-
tion. Allowable applications requiring consideration for processing under
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22
applications require further review for property interests.
There are two classes of inventions that are subject to is-
suance of secrecy orders: (1) inventions in which the govern-
ment has a property interest"' and disclosure of which might
be detrimental to the national security as determined by the
head of an interested government agency, and (2) inventions
in which the government does not have a property interest,
but disclosure of which will be detrimental to the national se-
curity as determined by the head of a "defense agency""' of
the United States. Thus, the Commissioner of Patents has a
sufficient basis to issue a secrecy order if a defense agency be-
lieves that disclosure of the information in the application
would be detrimental to the national security.
It is not necessary to determine whether the subject mat-
Section 152 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. § 2182) and/or Section
305 of the Space Act (42 U.S.C. § 2457c) are processed to issue, includ-
ing counting of the issue, and forwarded through Group 220 to the office
of Quality Review and Patent Issue Division. When the security status
of the application cannot be promptly decided, Group 220 will report
the progress that has been made to the group director. Any action to be
taken in the case, for the purpose of advancing said group date, must be
arranged through the group director.
24. Id.
25. Congress broadened the definition of a defense agency as it is used in 35
U.S.C. § 181. This term applies to "the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of
Defense, and the chief officer of any other department or agency of the Government
designated by the President as a defense agency of the United States." Id.
Subsequent to enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 181, the Atomic Energy Commission was
abolished. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 104, 88 Stat.
1237 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5814 (1976)). The Energy Reorganization Act vested the
Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration with all the
functions of the Commission. Id. at § 104(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 5814 (1976)). Spe-
cial presidential designations pursuant to this provision are published in the Federal
Register. The Department of Justice has been designated as a defense agency by this
procedure for purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 181. See ExEcuTivE ORDER No. 10,457, 18 Fed.
Reg. 3,083 (1953). Although it claims no part in the procedure to review applications,
the Department of Justice recommended issuance of secrecy orders on three occa-
sions. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 14; Hearings, supra note 1, at 250 (Testimony of
H. Miles Foy, Senior Attorney-Advisor, Department of Justice).
In 1977, the Department of Energy was established. Department of Energy Or-
ganization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91 § 201 91 Stat. 569 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7131
(Supp. 1971)). Section 301 of the Act transferred the functions of the Administrator
of the Energy Research and Development Administration. Id. at § 301 (codified at 42
U.S.C. 715) (Supp. 1979).
Although § 181 refers to the Atomic Energy Commissions, the functions of the
Commission have been transferred to the Department of Energy. Thus, the Depart-
ment of Energy is a "defense agency" for purposes of the Secrecy Order Statute.
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ter of the application is patentable' prior to the issuance of a
secrecy order. This question of patentability is generally de-
termined during the application process. In order to be wor-
thy of a patent, an invention must have a patentable subject
matter 27 and be new, useful 8 and nonobvious .2 However, the
Patent Office does not make any determinations concerning
these patent requirements before a secrecy order is issued. 0
Therefore, an invention on which a secrecy order issues need
not be patentable.
2. National Security
The key to the secrecy order procedure is a fear that the
national security will be compromised. In the Invention Se-
crecy Act, Congress delegated the power to determine when to
defend the national security to the heads of government agen-
cies.831 Such a delegation is proper, provided Congress had the
power originally. However, a problem arises when this power
is delegated without sufficient guidelines.
Congress did not expressly define the term "national se-
26. The list of subjects which are within the statutory definitions of patentable
subject matter is to be found in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976), as further defined in §§ 100,
171. Generally, however, one need only consider 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101, since the vast
majority of patents sought are of the type called "utility" patents, defined therein.
These sections provide:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
When used in this title unless the context otherwise indicates-
(a) The term "invention" means invention or discovery.
(b) The term "process" means process, art or method, and includes
a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or material.
35 U.S.C. § 100 (1976).
27. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100, 101, 171 (1976).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). See Beidler v. United States, 253 U.S. 447, 453(1920). The standard of utility is generally held to be "commercial utility" rather
than "that a process produces the result intended and is not 'detrimental to the pub-
lic interest.'" Beidler v. U.S., 333 F.2d 234, 238 (CCPA, 1964).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
30. The Patent Office has issued secrecy orders on inventions that are prima
facie not patentable, due to unpatentable subject matter. The defense agencies and
the Patent Office view the secrecy order as a method for controlling information gen-
erally, not just patents. REPORT, supra note 1, at 42.
31. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
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curity" in the Invention Secrecy Act. The Act reveals a con-
gressional concern with war, hostilites, national emergencies,
and foreign filing of United States patent applications. In
each of these areas, foreign nationals are implicitly the enti-
ties who cannot be trusted with the information in the appli-
cations. The Senate Report of the 1951 Act is more narrowly
focused on national defense and inventions useful in war.2 In
addition, the Senate Report expresses a concern for classified
information contained in patent applications. 3 However, be-
cause "national security" is not defined in the Act, the param-
eters of the term must be found in other federal statutes with
related interests, or in other government documents.
The government classifies sensitive information in order
to further national security. The Classification Order34 defines
the current hierarchy of classified information. The classifica-
tion order defines national security as follows: "'National se-
curity' means the national defense and foreign relations of the
United States."35 This definition is consistent with national
security as a function of the executive branch. The President,
as the only representative of the nation as a whole, has inher-
ent foreign affairs power. 86 Congressional delegation of foreign
affairs powers to the President is subject to fewer restrictions
than the delegation of such powers to another entity. 7 Where
regulatory authority for foreign affairs is delegated to some
entity other than the President, the United States Supreme
Court requires that Congress define standards for applying
the regulation." The lack of guidelines in the Act indicating
when information is detrimental to the national security al-
lows the agencies to apply the secrecy order procedures
indiscriminately.
Because delegations of foreign affairs powers to non-Pres-
32. S. REP. No. 1001 supra note 13.
33. Id. at 2-3.
34. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1978).
35. Id. at 28,961.
36. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). See
also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 69, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2112, 2156-57.
37. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319-29 (1936).
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
407 (10th ed. 1980).
38. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935).
[Vol. 22
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idential entities are more closely scrutinized, limitations on
Congressional delegation of foreign affairs power to the Presi-
dent apply to sinlilar delegations to federal agencies. There-
fore, the admonitions of the Supreme Court in United States
v. United States District Court"' apply to delegations of for-
eign affairs power to federal agencies. In United States v.
United States District Court, the United States Supreme
Court considered the Presidential national security exceptions
to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act." The issue was whether the Presidential powers to pro-
tect national security are limited if individual rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution were violated. The Court found that
the wiretap statute "does not attempt to define or delineate
the powers of the President to meet domestic threats to the
national security, ' 41 but that where only domestic aspects of
national security are involved, the fourth amendment prior
warrant requirement must be fulfilled. Pointing to the list of
crimes specifically delineated in the wiretap statute,' the
Court concluded that even in federal crimes, such as espio-
nage, which may involve either domestic or foreign security
threats, the wiretap statute requires prior judicial approval of
surveillance in the form of a warrant.4" The Court held that
activities threatening domestic security were insufficient
grounds to deny constitutionally protected individual rights.
However, the Court expressly chose not to voice an opinion on
constitutionally protected rights where the activities threaten
foreign security."
Therefore, federal agencies may not deny individual free-
39. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
40. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20
(1976). This Act allows certain people, under authority of the Attorney General, to
seek court orders approving wiretaps and electronic surveillance of individuals in cer-
tain classes of activities, listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
41. 407 U.S. at 322.
42. Id. at 321.
43. Congress has subsequently modified the warrant requirement in the case of
surveillance, for the purpose of gathering intelligence about foreign powers to which
no United States person is a party, in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811 (West Supp. 1979). This Act is very specific in its direction
toward foreign powers and away from private United States people. Id. at § 1802
(a)(1)(A) and (B).
44. This bifurcation of government national security interests is also apparent
in Executive Order No. 12,065 in its definition of national security. See also United
States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 1979), quoting Gorin v. United States,
312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941); Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
1982] 335
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doms protected by the constitution on the grounds of a threat
to domestic security. The prerequisite for denial of individual
constitutional rights is either a threat to a foreign national se-
curity interest or a warrant issued upon probable cause that a
crime has been committed.
A federal regulatory scheme concerned with national se-
curity is the International Traffic on Arms Regulation
(ITAR). 5 The purpose of ITAR is to regulate goods and infor-
mation exported from the United States in order to further
national security and national defense interests."' ITAR is ad-
ministered by the State Department. Some information on
which secrecy orders have been issued is also covered by
ITAR where the information is to be exported or made availa-
ble internationally.4 7
Both ITAR and the Invention Secrecy Act require the li-
censing of information before the invention is exported, but
neither includes standards for issuing or denying licenses.
This lack of standards "sufficiently precise to guard against
arbitrary and inconsistent administrative actions," is con-
ceded to be a fundamental flaw in ITAR.' 8 This article con-
tends that the similar lack of precise standards for application
of the Invention Secrecy Act poses serious problems as to the
constitutionality of the Act.
45. 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-128 (1979). These rules governing foreign export of goods
and knowledge have been strengthened by the passage in September 1979 of the Ex-
port Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-
2421 (Supp. 1979). This Act provides that new rules and regulations be printed in the
Federal Register by October 1, 1980. The Department of Energy's list of military
critical technologies retained an exception in category IX. See 45 Fed. Reg. 65167
(1980); REPORT, supra note 1, at 109.
46. 34 Fed. Reg. 12029 (1969).
47. See supra note 6. Only limited or restricted distribution information would
be covered by ITAR, if published in some form, since materials available to the pub-
lic are exempt from rules controlling exports. Shapely & Kolata, Cryptology: Scien-
tists Puzzle Over Threat to Open Research Publication, 197 Sci. 1345, 1348 (1977);
22 C.F.R. § 125.11(a) (1979).
48. Memorandum prepared by Asst. Attorney General John Harmon (May 11,
1978). The memorandum concluded that "the existing provisions of the ITAR are
unconstitutional insofar as they establish prior restraint on disclosure of crypto-
graphic ideas and information developed by scientists and mathematicians in the pri-
vate sector." See REPORT, supra note 1, at 26 n.48; Hearings, supra note 1, at 260-61;
Sanders, Data Privacy: What Washington Doesn't Want You To Know, REASON 25,
37 (Jan. 1981).
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3. Classified Information
The Secrecy Order Statute provides that the application
shall be sealed where a proper showing is made, by the head
of an agency, that a secrecy order should be issued on the pat-
ent application. e The Senate Report on the 1951 Act clarifies
that this provision was added to handle patent applications
containing information "which has been classified as secret,"
in lieu of prohibiting the filing of such an application." Such
classifications are made pursuant to the Classification Order.
All other provisions of the Secrecy Order Statute apply to an
application containing classified information, but only a clas-
sified application may be sealed.5 Information designated as
classified under the Classification Order 52 receives special
treatment.
Discussing civilian research, the Classification Order
states:
A product of non-government research and develop-
ment that does not incorporate or reveal classified infor-
mation to which the producer or developer was given
prior access may not be classified under the Order until
or unless the government acquires a proprietary interest
in the product."'
The Classification Order also provides that although "scien-
tific or technological . . . matters relating to the national se-
curity"5 ' are proper information for classification, "[b]asic sci-
entific research information not clearly related to the national
security may not be classified. '55 Implicit in these provisions
is the assumption that information to be classified must meet
some threshold. Areas in which government concern might be
sufficient to warrant classification are listed in the Order.5
49. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (1976). Neither the statute nor the rules of the various agen-
cies define what a "proper" showing should be. REPORT, supra note 1, at 11. The
consensus among agency personnel questioned by the Subcommittee is that the Com-
missioner of Patents is to use his discretion to determine when such a showing is
"proper."
- 50. S. REP. No. 1001, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1321, 1322 (1952).
51. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 18, at § 109.
52. Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,952 (1978).
53. Id., § 1-603 at 28,953 (emphasis added).
54. Id., § 1-301(e) at 28,951.
55. Id., § 1-602 at 28,953.
56. Id., § 1-301 at 28,951.
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This list, however, includes a catch-all category which pro-
vides that the opinion of an agency head is sufficient justifica-
tion.5 7 Therefore, the determination by the head of a defense
agency that information contained in a patent application
would be detrimental to the national security is sufficient to
classify the information according to the Classification Order.
The same determination is used to classify the information is
also sufficient to seal the application.
Despite the similarities between the Classification Order
and the Secrecy Order Statute, there is an important differ-
ence in the language of the sections. Whereas the Secrecy Or-
der Statute requires that the government have a "property"
interest in the information contained in the patent applica-
tion, the Classification Order requires that the government
have a "proprietary" interest in the information."
4. Property interest in a patent application
After national security, the next key element is the prop-
erty interest in the filed patent application. Property interest
in an unpatented idea is important from two perspectives:
government property interest in the invention, and the inven-
tor's property interest in his idea. As will be discussed below,
these two areas of interest are not mutually exclusive. The Se-
crecy Order Statute creates two classes of applications based
on whether the government has a property right in the
claimed invention.' According to the Manual of Patent Ex-
amining Procedure, the Patent Office reviews applications for
government property interests only under the AEA and the
NASA. e0 This fact implies that no other statutes are the bases
for government property interests in patent applications."
57. Id.
58. Of course, where the government has no property interest, a defense agency
head may succeed in having a secrecy order issue based on his judgment that disclo-
sure of the information would be detrimental to the national security. 35 U.S.C. § 181
(1976).
59. See notes 24 and 25 and accompanying text.
60. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 18, at § 107.01 (3d
perm. ed. rev. 1974).
61. The differentiation between property and proprietary government interest
is blurred by SENATE REPORT No. 1001 which accompanies the Act. This document
describes the government property interest as requiring less than full legal title. S.
Rep. No. 1001, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1322 (1952); REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
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However, statutes reserving less than exclusive legal title to
inventions, ideas, or information for the government can cre-
ate a government proprietary interest in such inventions,
ideas, or information.2 Whereas property contemplates exclu-
sive legal rights to possess, enjoy, and dispose of something,
proprietary contemplates legal rights that need be neither ex-
clusive nor absolute.
The common characteristic of the second class of patent
application is a lack of a government property right in the
claimed invention. The government may have a proprietary
interest supported by statute in some of the inventions in this
class of applications. Despite any government interest, how-
ever, the applicant may also have property rights. This article
contends that the courts should recognize that the applicant
has property rights in his unpatented invention which are not
foreclosed by either a government claim of a property interest
or the government's vesting of either a property or a proprie-
tary interest in the invention.
The courts have not provided clear definitions of an in-
ventor's rights in an invention after he has filed a patent ap-
plication but before a patent has been granted. The current
federal rule, as explained in Mullins Mfg. v. Booth," is: "The
right of [the inventor] . . . to his invention while his applica-
tion is pending is an inchoate right, which matures as prop-
erty when the patent issues, and it may have great prospective
value.""' In Farrand Optical Co. v. United States," a federal
district court recognized an inventor's unspecified interest in
his invention and his right to file a patent application in spite
of a classified contract with the government covering the use
of the invention. The court found that the attitude of the ap-
plicant was important to the characterization of the invention:
"Plaintiff's attitude at all times was that of an owner of a val-
uable property right who was zealously protecting its
property."66
These opinions conflict with the general principle of trade
secret law that a novel idea which has been reduced to prac-
tice and is capable of being sold or transferred has recogniza-
62. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 18, at § 107.
63. 125 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1942).
64. Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
65. 175 F. Supp. 230, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
66. Id. at 249.
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ble value as property. 7 Federal courts have not applied this
rule of trade secrets to patent applications. However, trade
secrets is clearly a related area of intellectual property law.
The principal that the owner of an idea owns something of
value and has analogous rights.is supported by case law as far
back as 1928.68 By comparison, patent decisions have stead-
fastly refused to recognize value and rights in ideas that are
not held to be patentable.09 In this author's view, the logic of
such decisions is unsound.
These three elements of a trade secret are closely related
to the four requirements for patentability. The first element is
that the idea must be reduced to practice. Patents must also
be reduced to practice before a patent may be filed.70  This
rule is liberalized to the extent that an application itself is
deemed constructive reduction to practice.7 ' The element of
reduction to practice measures the maturity of the idea and
the knowledge of its concrete embodiments.
The second element, capability of being sold or trans-
ferred, is a corollary to reduction to practice. Once an inven-
tion has been constructively reduced to practice, it may be li-
censed to others or sold. An actual sale or transfer, which
requires an actual market for the idea, is not required. There-
fore, any patent application describing a mature idea auto-
matically meets two of the three requirements for trade secret
property.
The third element of trade secret property, novelty, is
also one of the requirements for patentability.72 Trade secrets,
however, require a lesser degree of novelty than patents.7
Therefore, a review of a patent application for completeness,
67. R. M. MILGRIM, 2 TRADE SECRETS 8-38 (1967); Irizarry y. Puente v. Presi-
dent and Fellows of Harvard College, 248 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1957); Moore v. Ford
Motor Co., 28 F.2d 529 (S.D. N.Y. 1928), aff'd, 43 F.2d 685, 686 (2d Cir. 1930); Davis
v. General Motors Corp., 196 U.S.P.Q. 218, 222 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Miller, Caffey & Co.
v. Bristol Meyers Co., 184 U.S.P.Q. 306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); Brenner v. Stix, Baer &
Fuller Co., 352 Mo. 1225, 181 S.W.2d 643, 648 (1944).
68. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 28 F.2d 529 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 43 F.2d 685, 686 (2d
Cir. 1930).
69. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
70. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).
71. 1 DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 47 at 210-215 (2d ed. 1964).
72. A patentable invention must be novel, useful, nonobvious, and of patentable
subject matter.
73. Official Airlines Schedule Information Service, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 333 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1964).
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to establish reduction to practice, which will also imply trans-
ferability, plus a review of the invention for trade secret nov-
elty would be a sufficient determination of the inventor's
property interest in his application.
The question of an inventor's property interest in an un-
patented invention is important, whether or not the govern-
ment has claimed a property interest in the invention. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether an inventor
had any rights in his invention where the government had
both possible shop right74 and AEA claims in Hobbs v. United
States.75 The court concluded that even if the government
had a valid shop right or AEA claim in the invention, "other
valuable rights remain the property of the inventor. ' 71 This
conclusion is significant because the government's claims to
Hobbs' invention were initiated after the patent application
was filed, but before the patent was granted. Following the
Mullins rule," the Hobbs court recognized inchoate property
rights in the application. The court concluded that the values
represented by potential sale and licensing rights, as well as
potential royalties from the government, did not exhaust the
value inherent in the application.78  Therefore, government
property rights, based on either NASA or AEA, may diminish
an inventor's property rights in his unpatented invention.
However, such government property rights do not obliterate
all property rights in the invention.
Although the Hobbs opinion distinguishes individual and
government property rights in inventions, its analysis is in-
complete. A corollary to the Mullins rule is that there can be
no vested property rights in a patent application. Under this
rule, the government should not be able to obtain vested
property rights in an application. Reading Hobbs and Mullins
together, the government should only obtain a vested interest
in an invention after the patent issues. At best, the govern-
ment's property interest in an unpatented invention can only
74. "The classic shop rights doctrine ordains that when an employee makes and
reduces to practice an invention on his employer's time, using his employer's tools,
and the services of other employees, the employer is the recipient of an implied,
nonexclusive, royalty-free license." Hobbs v. United States, 376 F.2d 488, 494 (5th
Cir. 1967), citing Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426 (1896).
75. 376 F.2d 488 (1967).
76. Id. at 492, 493.
77. 125 F.2d at 664.
78. Id.
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be an inchoate property right.
However, this analysis of case law is contradicted in the
area of atomic energy. Since 1967, data to which the Re-
stricted Data label of the AEA applies has been recognized as
"born classified. ' 79 In the atomic energy area, no affirmative
action by the interested federal agency is required before the
data is classified. Legal scholars have emphasized, that neither
the "born classified" concept nor its application to private
data are expressly authorized by the AEA.80 Further, a pro-
posed AEA regulation which would have expressly embodied
the "born classified" concept and criminal sanctions for viola-
tion was never promulgated.8' Therefore, the "born classified"
concept applied to data regulated by the AEA remains a pol-
icy based on fiction and wishful thinking.
Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr. proposed an
amendment to the AEA and identified three elements to the
"born secret" concept: (1) the classification procedures and
policies of the Department of Energy, (2) the ambiguity of the
present law as it is interpreted by the Energy and Justice De-
partments, and (3) increasing public dispersion of scientific
data bearing on construction and use of weapons which can
destroy mankind. 2 These factors combine to create an envi-
ronment where "the government is now depending on the
threat of criminal prosecution to force scientists, both govern-
ment and private, into restraint in the communication of
ideas, while conceding that if criminal prosecution were at-
tempted it probably would fail."" In response, McCloskey's
amendment would expressly limit the definition of "Re-
stricted Data" to exclude properly published information, and
79. REPORT, supra note 1, at 184. Without ever using the term, the Atomic En-
ergy Commission had, since its inception in 1946, adopted the "born classified" con-
cept as a working assumption. And, although neither the Commission nor the staff
acknowledged the presence of the "born classified" concept, it was an underlying
thread throughout their deliberations. Id. at 178.
80. Id. at 184-85.
Among those commenting were: Committee on Atomic Energy; New York City
Bar Association; The American Civil Liberties Union; The Atomic Industrial Forum;
General Electric Company; Union Carbide Corporation; Allied Chemical Corporation;
Esso Research and Engineering Company. Most of the comments from these organi-
zations were related to questions of practicality and administration of the regulation.
Id.
81. Id. at 185-87.
82. Id. at 188.
83. Id.
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remove use of threat as an enforcement tool.84 Therefore, the
AEA "born classified" policy conflicts with the rule of Hobbs
and Mullins, has no basis in law, and is not enforceable
against private data. In AEA cases against private inventors,
then, the Hobbs-Mullins rule should prevail to eliminate the
spectre of a vested government property interest in privately-
generated ideas.
A government claim to property right in an invention
submitted for a patent does not a priori deprive the inventor
of any property right. If the government claim of right exists
without proof of its validity, then the inventor's entitlement
to the rights associated with the patent application has not
been affected. Only a question of divestiture has been raised.
Indeed, Hobbs stands for the proposition that even a proven
government interest in the invention fails to foreclose abso-
lutely the inventor's interest in the invention. If a proven in-
terest fails to exhaust all property claims in an unpatented
invention, then an unproven assertion of an interest must
foreclose even less.
5. The Relationship Between Secrecy Orders and
Cryptography
As discussed previously, the media has publicized several
instances of government interference in cryptography re-
search." The interference in cryptography was initiated by
the NSA, the agency primarily responsible for cryptography in
the United States."6 However, cryptography is not covered by
either the AEA or NASA. Therefore, cryptography is not sub-
ject matter in which the government can claim a property in-
terest. The basis for interference, then, must be that disclo-
sure of information about new developments in civilian
84. Id. at 193, 243-44. "Restricted Data" is a term of art, derived from §
2014(11)(g) of the AEA, defined as follows:
all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic
weapons; (2) the production of specific nuclear material; or (3) the use of
special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not in-
clude data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category
pursuant to section 2162 of this title.
85. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
86. Shapely, NSA Slaps Secrecy Order on Inventors' Communications Patent,
201 Sci. 891, 893 (Sept. 1978). NSA's recommendation for a secrecy order on the
Nicolai application was supported by concurring recommendations by the Navy and
the Air Force, although the Army disagreed.
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cryptography poses a threat to the national security. Even
though the Secrecy Order Statute does not expressly require
more, such an unsupported allegation is a weak basis for an
interference as drastic as a secrecy order.
a. Generally. Civilian cryptography is not expressly cov-
ered by any legislation."7 Consequently, the government can
claim no property interest in it. Nor is there any statutory
basis for government to claim a national security interest in
civilian cryptography. However, unclassified information re-
lated to design, manufacture or use of munitions are con-
trolled, in the interests of national security, by the Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)8 8 and the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR).89 Under the ITAR, civil-
87. Disclosure of codes, ciphers and related tools is regulated by 18 U.S.C. §
798. This section brings the handling and generating of information related to cryp-
tography that the government would like to restrict as classified in the interests of
national security under government scrutiny. Three conditions must be satisfied
before an activity is subject to control under this section: (1) whether the activity in
which the researcher is engaged is cryptography, (2) whether the information handled
by the researcher is classified, and (3) whether the government has a legitimate na-
tional security interest in the research. Section 798 prescribes criminal sanctions.
The definitions included in § 798 clarify that the section applied only to existing
government cryptography systems, or systems under government contracts, or by gov-
ernment employees. But any of the wide range of cryptographic systems in use at any
given time could be classified on the grounds that "somewhere a related crypto-
graphic system is in use." REPORT, supra note 1, at 77 (Letter from Cipher A. De-
vours to Public Cryptography Study Group June 10, 1980). Section 798 applies to
civilian cryptography research and developments only where they duplicate classified
codes, ciphers or cryptographic systems developed by the government.
'Cryptography' encompasses signal security and signal intelligence.
The former includes all ways of keeping secret both human messages,
such as telegrams and telephone conversations, and electronic messages,
such as computer-to-computer data exchanges. These ways include
cryptography-varied techniques for putting messages into secret form by
code or cipher ....
Signal intelligence comprises all methods of extracting information
from transmissions.
Kahn, Cryptology Goes Public, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 141, 144-45 (1979). See also D.
KAHN, THE CODEBREAKERS, xiii-xvi (1967); Feistal, Cryptography and Computer Pri-
vacy, Sci. AM., Vol. 288, No. 4, at 15 (May 1973); H. F. GAINES, CRY'TANALvsis: A
STUDY OF CIPHERS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS, 1 (1956); Davida, Wells, and Kam, Security
and Privacy, IEEE COMPUTER SOC'Y INT'L COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND APPLICATIONS
CONFERENCE, 2D, PROCEEDINGS (Nov. 13-16, 1978).
88. 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.01-130 (1981).
89. The current EAR, printed at 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399.2 (1981) are authorized
by 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2402-03 as amended. These regulations are in the process of
change, in response to studies conducted, beginning in 1977. Proposals resulting from
this study are published in 45 Fed. Reg. 65014-19, 65152-67 (Oct. 1, 1980).
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ian cryptography is regulated as "technical data." 0 Under the
proposed EAR, such data is to be regulated as a "military
critical technology." 9' Thus, there is some precedent for an
interest in the impact of exporting cryptologic information or
tools.
All cryptography patents are, therefore, screened by the
Patent Office security group for possible national security
problems. The apparent scope of Group 220's interest in
cryptography includes codes, code receivers, and code trans-
mitters within class 178 and certain teachings within class
35.92 Compared to the parameters used by the defense agen-
cies to determine whether the government has a national se-
curity interest in the information, these bounds on the gov-
ernment's interest are both accessible and specific. Criteria
developed by the Department of Defense and the NSA to de-
90. [Tjhe term "technical data" means: (a) Any unclassified information
that can be used or be adapted for use in the design, production, manu-
facture, repair, overhaul, processing, engineering, development, opera-
tion, maintenance, or reconstruction of arms, ammunition, and imple-
ments of war on the U.S. Munitions List; (b) any technology which
advances the state-of-the-art or establishes a new art in the area of sig-
nificant military applicability in the United States; or (c) classified in-
formation as defined in § 125.02.
22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1981). This definition is a unilateral definition by the State De-
partment, unsupported by statute.
91. "Military critical technology" is a new approach to export regulation au-
thorized by the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA). The EAA is codified at 50
U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-20 (West Supp. 1979), Pub. L. No. 96-72, Sept. 29, 1979, 93
Stat. 503.
Section 2404(d) authorizes the Secretary of Defense to develop a list of "milita-
rily critical technologies," and directs him to emphasize the following: 1) arrays of
design and manufacturing know-how, 2) keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test
equipment, and 3) goods accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or
maintenance know-how, which are not possessed by countries to which exports are
controlled under this section, and which if exported, would permit a significant ad-
vance in a military system of any such country.
92. By matching the classes of arts which the Patent Office recognizes as cryp-
tography against the list of classes of arts which the Group 220 searches, the scope of
the security group's interest in cryptography is defined as including the following:
code receivers, class 178, subclasses 89 and following; code transmitters, class 178,
subclasses 79 and following; codes, class 178, subclass 113; and teaching, class 35,
subclasses 2 and following. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF CLASSIFICATION III-
13 (rev. perm. ed. 1979); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INDEX TO THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE
50 (1977).
An "art class" is a category used by the Classification Division of the Patent
Office to classify the novel element of the patent application for examination. These
categories include all the "useful arts" referred to in Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution. 2
DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 174, 175 at 829-30, 843 (2d ed. 1964).
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fine which information is possibly detrimental to the national
security are, as a general rule, classified.93 Therefore, a pro-
spective applicant for a patent has a difficult time determin-
ing whether any potential secrecy order problems exist con-
cerning his application before he files for a patent.
b. Problems with the Present Procedures for Secrecy
Orders. There are several serious defects in the current pro-
cedures. The notice of issuance of the secrecy order and sub-
sequent hearing provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act are
inadequate to meet the due process requirements of the fifth
amendment. The government's monopolization of the infor-
mation contained in the patent application as a result of the
secrecy order appears sufficiently restrictive and capricious to
be a taking of property for which just compensation is neces-
sary. Also, the prohibition on disclosure of information con-
tained in the patent application acts as a prior restraint on
the applicant's first amendment right to publish such
information.
(i) Denial of fifth amendment due process. Inventors
affected by secrecy orders have claimed that the effect of the
Invention Secrecy Act and related procedures constitutes a
denial of constitutional due process guarantees. In order to
characterize his complaint as a fifth amendment due process
claim, a patent applicant must address two issues: (1) whether
the government action deprived him of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, and (2) if such deprivation occurred, then what proce-
dure is due."
Taking of private property. To prove a "taking," the in-
ventor must show: state action, his property interest, and that
his property interest was taken by the state action.'6 On the
issue of state action, it is important to notice that patents are
purely federal and statutory in nature. The Constitution dele-
gates the power to legislate in the area to Congress. The pat-
ent statutes delegate congressional authority to various ad-
ministrative agencies of the federal government. The secrecy
93. Telephone interview with Samual Engle, a Patent Examiner for the Group
220 (March 3, 1980). See also Shapely, Intelligence Agency Chief Seeks "Dialogue"
with Academics, 202 Sci. 407, 409 (Oct. 1978); REPORT, supra note 1, at 48.
94. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 646-69 (10th ed. 1980).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V "No person shall ... be deprived of property, with-
out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
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order is an instrument of the administrative agencies; there-
fore, interference with property rights by secrecy order is state
action.
As discussed above,96 an inventor has at least inchoate
property rights in his invention before it is patented. These
rights are sufficiently far-ranging to prevent a proven govern-
ment property interest in the invention from depriving the in-
ventor of all property rights in it. The difficult question is
whether the secrecy order procedure denies the inventor's
property rights in his invention by state action. This question
incorporates the more specific question whether the secrecy
order procedure is a taking of the inventor's property without
the due process of law required by the fifth amendment.
That the secrecy order may be issued without prior judi-
cial review raises the issue whether the secrecy order proce-
dure is a taking of property without due process of law. The
Constitution requires that the victim of a taking receive "just
compensation. ,97
Eminent domain, the taking of private property for a
public use, is a function of the police power of the govern-
ment. In Berman v. Parker,98 the United States Supreme
Court discussed the definition of police power:
The definition is essentially the product of legislative
determinations addressed to the purposes of government,
purposes neither abstractly nor historically capable of
definition. Subject to specific constitutional limitations,
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well nigh conclusive."9
The courts generally defer to congressional determinations. 100
Moreover, the breadth of the concept of public welfare and
the public welfare purpose behind eminent domain causes the
courts to review eminent domain legislation with more than
the usual deference. 101 Secrecy orders are one of two types of
eminent domain: public emergency, or impairment of use. In
96. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
98. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
99. Id. at 32.
100. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 32-33, See also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952); Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S.
746, 746-55 (1884).
101. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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public emergency cases, courts generally defer to legislative
determinations, but for impairment of use cases, an ad hoc
weighing of factors replaces the general rule.1 0 2
The asserted purpose for limiting disclosure of informa-
tion in a patent application is the detrimental effect on the
national security. This national security interest, whether for-
eign or domestic, is within the scope of the public's general
security interest. The issue remains whether the Invention Se-
crecy Act's limitation on disclosure is so restrictive that it sur-
passes mere regulation, and is therefore invalid if compensa-
tion is not provided.103
As discussed above, eminent domain legislation is re-
viewed with deference to congressional decisions. The fact
that there may be a less onerous alternative is not decisive.10 '
Congress' choice of means is presumptively valid.105
A secrecy order prohibits disclosure of information. This
is in many ways analogous to classification of information by a
government agency. Although classification of information
could result from disclosure of information to the Patent Of-
fice in a patent application, 1°0 the issuance of a secrecy order
merely restricts disclosure of the information contained in the
application. A secrecy order does not assign the information
to one of the classification categories specified in the Classifi-
102. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The factors
include: extent of harm to the private property, usually measured in terms of lost
value; benefits to the public, which is a rational relation scrutiny of the fit between
the government action and the public interest, with a view to the necessity of the
action; whether the government action is use of the property or prohibition of private
use; and the average reciprocity of advantage to the burdened property owner, which
inspects any benefits he receives by the government action.
103. The Invention Secrecy Act includes a Compensation Statute. 35 U.S.C.A.
§ 183 (1976). This statute, however, does not provide for compensation in all cases
where secrecy orders are imposed.
104. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). So long as the regulatory legislation bears a real and
substantial relationship to the object sought, the legislation will not be found to be
unconstitutional.
105. See De-Tom Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 337, 339 (Ct. Cl.
1977); Mosca v. United States, 417 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 911 (1970).
In Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239 (Ct. Cl. 1980), the court recognized
that in 35 U.S.C. § 183 the Congress elected to provide for compensation for "consid-
erable conduct outside the range of the just compensation clause of the fifth amend-
ment." Id. at 242.
106. See supra note 10. A portion of 35 U.S.C. § 181 deals with sealing the
patent application.
[Vol. 22
PATENT SECRECY ORDERS
cation Order, nor does it require proper stamping of the pages
and special handling rules as required in the Classification Or-
der. The question is whether the secrecy order's restriction on
dissemination of information amounts to a compensable
taking.
The Court of Claims considered the issue whether classi-
fication of information was a sufficient destruction of property
value to be a taking of private property for public use without
just compensation in Radioptics, Inc. v. United States.1"
The court found that the mere imposition of security restric-
tions on disclosure of the classified information to others,
without a prohibition of use of the information, did not pre-
vent Radioptics from protecting or enhancing the value of the
property.108 Although Radioptics was prohibited from disclos-
ing the detailed contents of its proposal to persons outside
Radioptics without prior permission from the Atomic Energy
Commission, Radioptics could discuss the process in general
terms without restriction. The court held the limitations to
be de minimus and the purpose behind the AEA to be a
proper protection of the public welfare.109 Such a use of the
police power for a proper public purpose does not require
compensation under the fifth amendment.110
Comparing the secrecy order to the alleged taking by
classification in Radioptics, the mere limitation on disclosure
imposed by the secrecy order is not a fifth amendment taking
which requires just compensation because it is less intrusive
than a classification of information.
Although Radioptics is authority for the proposition that
classification of private information does not constitute a tak-
ing, the holding ignores the realities of a classification and a
secrecy order. The fact is that a secrecy order substantially
inhibits an inventor's ability to enhance the value of his prop-
erty. Indeed, if enhancement procedures are initiated before
a secrecy order is issued, then they must cease after the order
107. 621 F.2d 1113 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
108. Id. at 1126-27. The realities of such a prohibition from disclosure appear to
have escaped the court's evaluation. See Id. at 1129.
109. Radioptics, 671 F.2d at 1127. "[W]here the purpose of a regulation which
causes interference with property rights is to prevent injury to the public welfare as
opposed to merely bestowing upon the public a nonessential benefit, compensation
under the fifth amendment is not required." Id. The court cites Franco-Italian Pack-
aging Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 408, 414 (Ct. Cl. 1955) as authority.
110. Id.
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is issued to prevent a violation of the order. This is especially
true where enhancement procedures are at the point of con-
tract negotiations.111 The merit of this contention lies in the
inventor's forced inability to disclose details of his invention.
No entrepreneur will invest in an unknown product. If an in-
ventor is prohibited, by law, from demonstrating to a poten-
tial investor that his invention is superior to a competitive
product, it will be impossible to acquire the venture capital
needed for the product's development.
In Constant v. United States,"" the United States Court
of Claims stated that loss proximately caused by the secrecy
order must be supported by "real concrete evidence of dam-
age" ' 8 to be compensable. This rule of actual damages was
propounded in light of the inventor's allegation of loss of pro-
spective users by the inability to disclose his invention. The
court held such allegations sufficient to state a cause of action
for damage caused by the secrecy order.'14 Thus, in light of
Constant v. United States, Radioptics is not settled law.
Procedural Due Process. Even where the government reg-
ulation of private property is not so severe as to constitute a
taking by eminent domain, the individual is still constitution-
ally entitled to procedural due process. The difficulty lies in
determining the appropriate procedures.
Generally, due process includes notice to the individual of
the impending deprivation of a right and the opportunity to
be heard."' The Invention Secrecy Act provides for notice to
the inventor that a secrecy order has issued, and for subse-
quent administrative and/or judicial proceedings. It is well
settled that the hearing need not precede the deprivation of
property or liberty in order to comply with constitutional due
process."' Subsequent hearings may not meet the constitu-
111. REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. Hearings supra note 1, at 237 (Testimony of
Paul Meiklejohn).
112. 617 F.2d 239 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
113. Id. at 244.
114. Id. The Constant case post-dates Radioptics.
115. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 259, 267-68 (1970).
116. The Court has consistently held that, where there is an adequate proce-
dure for subsequent judicial review, Congress may authorize an administrative agency
to regulate in a manner affecting property rights. Such regulatory power is not a dep-
rivation of due process rights. Fahey v. Malone, 332 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1947); Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 501, 519 (1944); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596-97
(1931).
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tional standard. The hearing must be provided before the
final administrative order becomes effective.' 17 Where no stat-
ute expressly provides for a hearing, the right to a hearing is
based on the complainant's entitlement to the property or lib-
erty."'8 In the context of secrecy orders, entitlement is crucial
to the right to a hearing only in cases where a patent is never
allowed. Inventors of allowed patents have rights to claim
compensation expressly within the Invention Secrecy Act, in
the Compensation Statute." 9 Entitlement is important to
117. See Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-53 (1941).
118. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
119. The Compensation Statute provides as follows:
An applicant, his successors, assigns, or legal representatives, whose
patent is withheld as herein provided, shall have the right, beginning at
the date the applicant is notified that, except for such order, his applica-
tion is otherwise in condition for allowance, or February 1, 1952, which-
ever is later, and ending six years after a patent is issued thereon, to
apply to the head of any department or agency who caused the order to
be issued for compensation for the damage caused by the order of se-
crecy and/or for the use of the invention by the Government, resulting
from his disclosure. The right to compensation for use shall begin on the
date of the first use of the invention by the Government. The head of
the department or agency is authorized, upon the presentation of a
claim, to enter into an agreement with the applicant, his successors, as-
signs, or legal representatives, in full settlement for the damage and/or
use. This settlement agreement shall be conclusive for all purposes not-
withstanding any other provision of law to the contrary. If full settle-
ment of the claim cannot be effected, the head of the department or
agency may award and pay to such applicant, his successors, assigns, or
legal representatives, a sum not exceeding 75 per centum of the sum
which the head of the department or agency considers just compensa-
tion for the damage and/or use. A claimant may bring suit against the
United States in the Court of Claims or in the District Court of the
United States for the district in which such claimant is a resident for an
amount which when added to the award shall constitute just compensa-
tion for the damages and/or use of the invention by the Government.
The owner of any patent issued upon an application that was subject to
a secrecy order issued pursuant to section 181 of this title, who did not
apply for compensation as above provided, shall have the right, after the
date of issuance of such patent, to bring suit in the Court of Claims for
just compensation for the damage caused by reason of the order of se-
crecy and/or use by the Government of the invention resulting from his
disclosure. The right to compensation for use shall begin on the date of
the first use of the invention by the Government. In a suit under the
provisions of this section the United States may avail itself of all de-
fenses it may plead in an action under section 1498 of title 28. This
section shall not confer a right of action on anyone or his successors,
assigns, or legal representatives who, while in the full-time employment
or service of the United States, discovered, invented, or developed the
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every case, however, in defining the limits of the right which
has been allegedly infringed.120 In patent cases, an applicant
has entitlement to inchoate property rights, while the person
holding an allowance or issued patent is entitled to vested
property rights.
The Compensation Statute provides for compensation
proceedings, both administrative and judicial, once the patent
is in condition for allowance. 2' Thus, the proceeding will fol-
low the issuance of a secrecy order. However, the administra-
tive procedure, which may precede the lifting of the secrecy
order, is not expressly required to be a hearing.'2 2
The primary procedure authorized by the Compensation
Statute is administrative.12 3 The applicant has the right to
"apply to the head of any department or agency who caused
the order to be issued for compensation for the damage
caused by the order of secrecy and/or for the use of the inven-
tion by the Government."' ' In Farrand Optical Co. v.
United States,12 1 the court considered the provisions of the
Compensation Statute. The district court found that the
Compensation Statute
does not direct that the department or agency shall have
a hearing or making any finding, or even that it shall
make an award or that it shall make any determination.
Such a statute does not provide for administrative deter-
mination in the sense in which that word is ordinarily
used in requiring a claimant to exhaust his administrative
remedies before he turns to the court. 26
Thus, the provision for filing an administrative claim is insuf-
ficient to satisfy the traditional due process hearing require-
invention on which the claim is based.
35 U.S.C. § 183 (1976).
120. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (entitlement limited by procedural
requirements of the statute containing the entitlement). See also Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Property:" Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative
State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 183 (1976). A patent is "in condition for allowance" once an
examiner agrees with the applicant that his invention is patentable. This is a deter-
mination of status that precedes the granting of the patent. Reynolds, The Standard
of Invention in the Patent Office, DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (1960) 5.
122. See supra note 119.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
124. Id.
125. 133 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
126. Id. at 558.
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ments. Nor is the additional statutory provision for review of
the administrative action adequate to cure the deficiencies of
the administrative claim procedure.
These deficiencies result from a statutory focus on com-
pensation in both the administrative procedure and any re-
view of such procedure. Validity of the administrative action,
withholding or delaying the patent, is not an issue, nor is va-
lidity considered on review.1 27
Congress, however, never intended the administrative
procedure to be the sole recourse of an applicant victimized
by a secrecy order. The Compensation Statute provides for
both judicial review of the administrative claim and original
jurisdiction in the Court of Claims for compensation suits ini-
tiated by the patent owner on whose application a secrecy or-
der had been issued.12'8 Although jurisdiction in the Court of
Claims does not arise until the date of issuance, which follows
the date of allowance, this jurisdiction extends to all patentees
affected by secrecy orders. The requirement that issuance be
delayed does not apply to these court suits.2 9 Because the
procedure is judicial, it must meet fifth amendment due pro-
cess standards. Therefore, although the administrative claim
procedure provided is inadequate to protect the inventor's
rights to a timely subsequent hearing on the administrative
action of a secrecy order, the statutory provision for suit in
the Court of Claims without a prior administrative claim
satisfies fifth amendment due process requirements.
In spite of the above provisions, there remains a possible
class of applicants who were victims of secrecy orders, but
whose right to seek compensation for damages is not ad-
dressed in the Compensation Statute. The statute only ac-
knowledges claims for compensation submitted by persons
whose patents have been allowed or issued.1 80 Thus, those in-
ventors whose applications were subject to secrecy orders but
whose patent applications were later rejected do not expressly
127. In order to have standing to file an administrative claim, the inventor must
have had a secrecy order issued on his application, and this secrecy order must have
caused delay in the issuance of his patent. 35 U.S.C. § 183 (1976), construed in Con-
stant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239, 241 (Ct. Cl. 1980). A delay of even one day
would be sufficient to satisfy this condition. Id. at 243 n.10.
128. 35 U.S.C. § 183 (1976).
129. 617 F.2d at 243.
130. 35 U.S.C. § 183; Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d at 243.
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have standing to seek compensation for damages.
Recognizing that it is possible for a nonpatentable inven-
tion to be subjected to a secrecy order, the Patent Office
promulgated a rule81 providing procedures for handling appli-
cations which are rejected while under secrecy orders. " 2 This
rule provides that further prosecution 8 of such rejected ap-
plications, if appealed or otherwise not abandoned, will not be
heard until the secrecy order is lifted. Final rejection of a pat-
ent application, however, is not sufficient to cause the secrecy
order to be lifted. Thus, an invention may remain in the con-
trol of the Patent Office and defense agencies, through the ve-
hicle of the secrecy order, even though a patent examiner has
rejected the application for nonmeritorious claims. A final re-
jection will generally be based on the merits of the claims,
rather than on technical flaws in the application. By imple-
menting the Secrecy Order statute in a manner which does
not require the secrecy order to be lifted following a final re-
jection of the application, the Patent Office allows the defense
agencies to retain control over inventions which are either ob-
vious, not patentable subject matter,3' not new, or not useful,
or a combination of these factors.
One available ground for rejection of a patent application
is obviousness. An invention may be obvious if it is found to
131. 37 C.F.R. § 5.3 (1981), reprinted in 35 U.S.C.A. § 188 (West Supp. 1981),
provides:
Unless specifically ordered otherwise, action on the application by
the Office and prosecution by the applicant will proceed during the time
an application is under secrecy order to the point indicated in this
section:
(a) National applications under secrecy order which come to a final
rejection must be appealed or otherwise prosecuted to avoid abandon-
ment. Appeals in such cases must be completed by the applicant but
unless otherwise specifically ordered by the Commissioner will not be set
for hearing until the secrecy order is removed.
132. Id. Generally, a final rejection does not occur until the second office action,
or later. The final rejection is a final judgment on the merits of the claims of the
application. Prosecution of the application may continue after a final rejection in the
form of interviews or amendments, but the scope of prosecutions is greatly dimin-
ished. 5 DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS, § 454, at 403-09 (2d ed. 1972).
133. 37 C.F.R. § 5.3. Prosecution of a patent application is generally an ex parte
procedure. Prosecutions may go to matters of substance or form of an application,
and usually both are involved. Generally, a prosecution will take the form of either a
written office action from the Patent Office or a written reply from the applicant. 5
DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 132, at § 454, at 389, 391.
134. Some examples of inventions which are not statutory patentable subject
matter are computer software and mathematical formulae.
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be either totally within the prior art 85 or obvious to one
skilled in the applicable art. The patent laws protect such in-
formation from a limited monopoly on the theory that such
information is property within the public domain.13 6 If an in-
vention under a secrecy order is rejected on the grounds of
obviousness, the government agency which caused the secrecy
order to issue would have an extremely difficult time proving
to a court how disclosure of the information in such an appli-
cation could be detrimental to the national security. To allow
government agencies to request issuance of secrecy orders on
information which is sufficiently public to be unpatentable
stifles useful research. This is contrary to the purposes of the
patent laws as stated in the United States Constitution.
Government control of an invention which has no utility
probably generates no harm. The attributes of obviousness,
nonpatentability of subject matter and lack of novelty, how-
ever, are all symptomatic of inventions which are within the
public domain. A public idea cannot be controlled by a single
individual. The government should not be able to exact li-
censes or penalties for the use of ideas which are concededly
public.
The Invention Secrecy Act operates on the presumption
that if a patent never issues, or is never allowed, then the ap-
plicant who has received a secrecy order on his invention has
suffered no actionable harm.18 7 The presumption is conclusive
as to applicants whose patents are rejected. A conclusive pre-
sumption, when embodied in a statute, is an attempt to legis-
late a fact that cannot be proven in actuality."' In Mobile, J.
135. DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 132, at § 454 at 360-89. The
term "prior art" is not defined in the patent statutes. The term ranges broadly to
include patents (including co-pending and foreign patents, but not including aban-
doned applications), printed publications, public uses and sales, common knowledge
in the art, or any knowledge publicly available whether or not used by others.
136. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc.
v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 37 (1969); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S.
39 (1966); Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
137. 35 U.S.C. § 183 (1976). An applicant cannot seek compensation for damage
caused by the secrecy order unless and until the patent is in condition for allowance.
138. Henner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 329 (1932). "This court has held more
than once that a statute creating a presumption which operates to deny a fair oppor-
tunity to rebut it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
"Nor is it material that the Fourteenth Amendment was involved in the Schles-
inger case [270 U.S. 230 (1926)], instead of the Fifth Amendment, as here. The re-
straint imposed upon legislation by the due process clauses of the two amendments is
the same." Id. at 326.
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& K. R. Co. v. Turnip Seed (Turnip Seed),1 3' the Supreme
Court discussed legislative presumptions. Due process re-
quires that there be a rational connection between the facts of
any given case and the facts presumed, and that there be no
unreasonable inferences. The legislative presumption "must
not, under the guise of regulating the presentation of evi-
dence, operate to preclude the party from the right to present
his defense to the main fact thus presumed . "... ,140 The
presumption that no harm results when a secrecy order is is-
sued to an applicant whose patent is rejected denies such an
applicant the chance to present his defenses to the legislative
presumption. Under Turnip Seed, this constitutes a denial of
due process. Where serious injury to an individual results
from government action whose "reasonableness depends on
fact findings, the evidence used to prove the [g]overnment's
case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an op-
portunity to show that it is untrue. 14 1 This rule, expounded
by the Supreme Court in Green v. McElroy,1 42 is not sus-
pended because some of the evidence in the government's case
is classified. An individual retains his right to examine the ev-
idence detrimental to his case and to have a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard.14 8
For such applicants who may not sue under the Compen-
sation Statute, but who have suffered "serious injury" as a re-
139. 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
140. Id. at 39.
141. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
142. Id.
143. The courts have approved in camera inspection of evidence claimed to be
sensitive or classified for the administrative claim procedures that can commence
before the secrecy order is lifted. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 43-44 (2d
Cir. 1953). One problem with such administrative procedures, however, is the lack of
personnel at the low levels that the defense agencies prefer to have handle the claims
who have security clearances sufficient to review the classified material. REPORT,
supra note 1, at 14-15. Although similar in camera proceedings might be required
where agencies still claim protection for their secrecy order criteria, the judicial pro-
ceedings in the Court of Claims should generally be free from such problems, since
the right to sue accrues after the secrecy order is lifted. Constant v. United States,
617 F.2d 239, 243 (Ct. Cl. 1980). Presumably, one whose application is rejected would
be required to wait until the secrecy order on his application is lifted before suing in
any court.
In addition, the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard in court where no
alternative forum is empowered to settle the dispute was approved by the Supreme
Court in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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suit of government actions,'1 4 the problem is finding a court
that has jurisdiction of both his cause of action and the defen-
dant. Some solutions to this jurisdiction problem are dis-
cussed below. " 5
A final due process problem remains for those who seek
compensation for damages caused by the secrecy order. On its
face, the Compensation Statute gives equal weight to suits for
damages caused by the secrecy order and damage caused by
governmental use of the invention.1"  The courts, however,
have placed a higher burden of proof on a claim for damages
caused by the secrecy order than on the use claim.14 7 This
judicial interpretation is in error. The federal courts are actu-
ally legislating from the bench when they interpret statutory
language in such a manner that, although two groups are on
an equal footing, the due process rights of one group are pre-
ferred over the due process rights of the other.
(ii) Denial of first amendment freedom to publish: Pa-
rameters of protected speech. As a prohibition on dissemina-
tion of information, the secrecy order appears to act as a prior
restraint on publication, thereby violating the first amend-
ment. A prior restraint is government action which restrains
expression before a court determines that the speech is unpro-
tected.'48 Although traditionally a prior restraint is an injunc-
tion issued by a court and enforced by the court's contempt
powers, there are other forms of prior restraints. One com-
mentator, after recognizing four classes of prior restraints,
concluded that the most serious form of prior restraint is that
which entrusts the restraint of communication to an executive
official. " 9 The secrecy order is clearly an example of such re-
straint. The authority to restrict communication of the con-
tents of the application is entrusted to the Commissioner of
144. Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
145. See infra, notes 184-199 and accompanying text.
146. 35 U.S.C. § 183 provides for "compensation for the damage caused by the
order of secrecy and/or for the use of the invention by the Government."
147. See Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1979); Halpern v. United
States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958); Farrand Optical v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 756
(S.D. N.Y. 1961); Gearon v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 910 (Ct. C1. 1953), cert. den.
348 U.S. 942 (1955); REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-8.
148. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW. & CoNraMP. PROBS.
648 (1956); Mohaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARv. L. REv. 518
(1970).
149. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW. & CONTrMP. PRODS.
648, 655-60 (1956).
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Patents and the heads of defense agencies.'
No court has determined whether a patent application is
protected speech. "' There are several possible characteriza-
tions of the patent application. Patent applications have edu-
cational value for others who do not care to duplicate the re-
search. In addition, Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, former head
of the NSA, has characterized the patent application as com-
mercial in nature. The patent protects the inventor's rights
while he makes a profit selling the invention to others.5'5 As
educational speech, the application would be protected by the
academic freedom concepts within the first amendment. " As
commercial speech, the application would receive lesser
protections.
In order to examine the protections afforded the patent
application in the worst case, and since less protection is af-
forded commercial speech, this article assumes that a patent
application is commercial speech. As commercial speech, the
application is subject to certain first amendment protections.
In Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Comm'n,54 the Su-
preme Court developed a four-part analysis to determine
whether or not a government regulation unconstitutionally re-
strains commercial speech. First, if the expression is not mis-
leading and the activity is lawful, the speech may be protected
by the first amendment. 155 Second, the interest asserted by
the government must be "substantial."' ' s If both these tests
are met, the court then must determine whether the regula-
tion "directly advances" the asserted government interest and
whether the regulation is "more extensive than is necessary to
150. In actual practice, the defense agency heads delegate the responsibility
downward. The result is that low-level administrators, without review by their superi-
ors, determine the agency's national security interest in various inventions. REPORT,
supra note 1, at 10-11.
151. REPORT, supra note 1, at 26; Hearings, supra note 1, at 268-84. (Memoran-
dum for John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Dept. of Justice, to Dr. Frank
Press (May 11, 1978)).
152. Shapely, Intelligence Agency Chief Seeks "Dialogue" with Academics, 202
Sci. 407 (October 1978). Inman contrasted a profit motive to a pure academic interest
that could be satisfied by publication in an academic journal. Id.
153. The problem of a secrecy order as a prohibited interference in academic
freedom is discussed in Comment, Patent Secrecy Act of 1952, 15 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 359, 387-389 (1980).
154. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
155. Id. at 564.
156. Id.
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serve that interest. ' 157
Under the four-part Central Hudson analysis, a patent
application is protected commercial speech. First, the activity
is lawful. Further, the information in the patent application
is required to be complete and truthful to meet the require-
ments of utility and candor.' " Thus, the application is not
misleading. Second, there are substantial government inter-
ests, including property and national security interests. Prop-
erty interests, because authorized by statute, are either sub-
stantial or nonexistent, depending on the subject matter of
the application. The national security interest, as the govern-
ment's interest in protecting its sovereignty, has been called
"the highest duty of every nation."11 Therefore, the national
security interest is substantial. Because the government inter-
est is substantial, the second prong of the Central Hudson
test is satisfied. Central Hudson requires, however, that where
the government has a valid interst in regulating truthful com-
mercial speech, the regulations must be narrowly drawn.
The last two prongs present issues regarding the secrecy
order procedure. The third prong of the Central Hudson test
provides that the statute may not be overly broad.1 0 There
are three kinds of overbreadth inherent in the secrecy order.
First, the tight time limitation imposed by Title 35 for apply-
ing for licenses to file and for filing in foreign countries"' en-
157. Id. at 564-70.
158. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1979) which provides:
A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark
Office rests on the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or
prosecutes the application and on every other individual who is substan-
tively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and
who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or with anyone to
whom there is an obligation to assign the application. All such individu-
als have a duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware of
which is material to the examination of the application. Such informa-
tion is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the
application to issue as a patent. The duty is commensurate with the de-
gree of involvement in the preparation of the application.
159. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519-20 (opinion of Justice Frank-
furter concurring) (quoting the Chinese Exclusion case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).
160. 447 U.S. at 565.
161. The Patent Cooperation Treaty, Pub. L. 94-131, 94th Cong.; 89 Stat. 685,
provides reciprocal treatment for patents filed by nationals of cooperating countries
and generally requires filing of applications outside the United States within 12
months of the U.S. filing date, according to article 22 of the Treaty.
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courages the defense agencies to recommend that the Patent
Office issue secrecy orders on applications where the threat to
the national security is only questionable. 62 During the first
six months after filing, the inventor needs a license to file in
any foreign country.' 68 If a secrecy order does not issue on an
application within six months after its filing date, then the
applicant does not need a license for foreign filing of his appli-
cation.' Second, the absence of a determination of patenta-
bility before issuance of a secrecy order allows government
control of unpatentable, public domain inventions. This prac-
tice creates a class of victims of secrecy orders who are denied
compensation for damages proximately caused by secrecy or-
ders. Third, the absence of a definition of national security in
the Act allows low level agency personnel to make policy de-
terminations concerning the degree of threat posed by various
areas of new technology in the private sector. To create proce-
dures sufficiently narrow to satisfy the Central Hudson re-
quirements, subsequent sections of this article suggest
changes to the current secrecy order procedures.
Central Hudson finally provides that the Secrecy Order
statute and related procedures are unconstitutional if the
means chosen by Congress do not directly advance the as-
serted interests in property and national security.' " Academi-
cians and individuals conducting research in cryptology have
expressed concern that the current procedures work against
both the public and the national interest.' They argue that
in areas where technological advances are marketable, the free
enterprise system produces a product superior to that pro-
duced by government. When the government, in addition to
working against the free enterprise system, is working in se-
crecy, the results are presumed to be inferior to that de-
manded by an interested market.'
162. See REPORT, supra note 1, at 86-87. The policy of agency officials entrusted
with implementing the secrecy order procedure is to err on the side of national secur-
ity where the decision whether to issue the order is questionable.
163. 35 U.S.C. § 184 (1977).
164. Id.
165. 447 U.S. at 564.
166. See Robertson, NSA Breaks Code Silence, Electronic News (Jan. 22,
1979), at 14, col. 1.
167. Similar concerns are currently being considered by Congress in relation to
the Atomic Energy Act and its effect of transforming inventions to which it is appli-
cable to the status of having been "born classified." See Sanders, Data Privacy: What
360 [Vol. 22
PATENT SECRECY ORDERS
The problem of determining whether the Act and agency
procedures directly advance the asserted national security in-
terest is compounded by the lack of guidelines within the stat-
ute. National security is not defined. 68 No criteria are speci-
fied in the Act. Individual defense agencies have discretion to
determine the parameters of the appropriate national security
interest. These agencies have an unlimited mandate to act,
but no mandate to provide due process. The fact that the leg-
islature could have defined "national security" leads to the
conclusion that the Act fails the Central Hudson test, despite
the fact that there is a substantial government interest pre-
sent. Therefore, the patent application is protected speech.""
Facial violation and violations by application. A statute
may violate the first amendment either because it is void on
its face or because it is improperly applied. An inventor may
violate the terms of the secrecy order and raise the defense
that the Invention Secrecy Act is facially void because it is
both unconstitutionally overbroad and impermissibly vague.
An inventor may also assert that the statute is facially valid
but improperly applied. However, the general rule is that a
challenger must comply with a facially valid statute, even if
invalidly applied,17 0 unless he was not able to obtain prompt
judicial review of the administrative action enforcing the stat-
utory restraints.17
Applying the general rule to the secrecy order, an inven-
tor expecting to challenge the validity of the law need not
comply with the law. This is due to the fact that there is no
judicial review of the secrecy order until both the order is
lifted and the patent is issued, events which may follow issu-
ance of the order by several years."
An inventor who wishes to obtain prompt judicial review
of the secrecy procedures may choose between procedures
based on the Federal Civil Rights Act or federal question ju-
risdiction discussed below. The immediately available proce-
Washington Doesn't Want You To Know, REASON Jan. 1981, 24, 34-35; REPORT,
supra note 1, at 120-72.
168. See 35 U.S.C. § 181.
169. 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980).
170. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1958).
171. Id. at 420 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147, 155 n.4 (1969).
172. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
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dure of petitioning the Commissioner of Patent for rescission
of the order17 is insufficient to meet the standard of judicial
review. Furthermore, the administrative compensation claim
procedure, available when the patent is allowed, is neither
sufficiently prompt nor sufficiently within the fifth amend-
ment due process requirements to meet the standard.17 4
Therefore, in order to challenge either the facial validity or
the application of the secrecy order procedures, an inventor
may violate the terms of the secrecy order and await com-
mencement of action by the Justice Department. Of course,
this procedure is available only if a suit in federal district
court under the Federal Civil Rights Act or federal question
jurisdiction is not promptly available.
Balancing of individual first amendment rights with na-
tional security. In the case of a secrecy order issued on an
invention, the judicial resolution of the inventor's prior re-
straint claim involves a balancing of the individual's first
amendment rights of free speech and freedom to publish
against the government's interest in national security. This is-
sue was first decided by the Supreme Court in New York
Times Co. v. United States (the Pentagon Papers case.) 175
The Court, in a plurality decision, denied the government's
right to prevent publication of a Pentagon study relating to
Viet Nam and a defense department study relating to the
Tonkin Gulf incident by the New York Times and the Wash-
ington Post. The government argued that it was acting within
the military security exception to the general prohibition
against prior restraint.17" However, in view of the heavy pre-
sumption against prior restraints, the Court found that the
government had not met the burden of justifying the re-
straint. The rule from the Pentagon Papers case 77 is that, in
173. 37 C.F.R. § 5.4 (1979) (now codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 188 (West Supp.
1979)). This petition for rescission of the secrecy order must precede an appeal to the
Secretary of Commerce, as provided by 35 U.S.C. § 181. See 37 C.F.R. § 5.8 (1979),
now codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 188 (West Supp. 1979).
174. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
175. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
176. 403 U.S. at 714. The military security exception derives from dictum in
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). The list of illustrative permissable "ex-
ceptional cases" include: (1) restraints during wartime to prevent disclosure of mili-
tary deployments or obstruction of military effort; (2) enforcement of obscenity laws;
and (3) enforcement of laws against incitement to acts of violence or revolution.
177. Each of the nine Supreme Court Justices wrote an opinion in this case.
The rule proposed as being drawn from the decision places more emphasis on the
362 [Vol. 22
PATENT SECRECY ORDERS
order to maintain its injunction, the government must over-
come the heavy presumption against prior restraints and show
an immediate, irreparable and certain harm of such compel-
ling nature that a court must protect the interest of the nation
and the people over the individual right to publish freely. "7
The issue was addressed several years later in United
States v. The Progressive."' The district court reviewed a
government application for prior restraints promoting na-
tional security under the AEA. Comparing the interests in-
volved in publishing information about H-bombs to the inter-
ests involved in publishing classified historical studies of
United States decision-making in Viet Nam, the court held
that a different rule should apply where the government's
prior restraint is not based on a federal statute.180 In a weak
analysis, the court rejected the Pentagon Papers rule. Reason-
ing that denial of the government's injunction would result in
the publication of technical information about an instrument
for mass destruction of human life, the court held that the
"disparity of the risk" attendant to each possible ruling was
sufficient to allow the court to conclude that the government
had met its burden of proof in the case.' 1
Reading the Pentagon Papers and The Progressive cases
together, a new rule emerges pertaining to conflicts between
national security and freedom of the press. First, because of
the general presumption against prior restraint, the govern-
ment must meet an unusually heavy burden to establish the
validity of prior restraint in any case. Where the government's
injunction is not predicated on a statute, the government
must show an immediate, irreparable, inevitable and direct
harm to the nation or its people to be proximately caused by
the publication. Where the injunction is predicated on a stat-
reasoning of the Justices who expressed an attempt to balance the interest of the
government in national security against the private right to publish than on the ex-
treme opinions. Two of the Justices found that prior restraints were proper in this
case. 403 U.S. 713 at 714-17, 719 (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., con-
curring); Id. at 748-52 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 752-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Id. at 759-63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1971) (per curiam).
178. 403 U.S. 713, at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 730 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Id. at 733 (White, J., concurring). See Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson,
283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
179. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
180. Id. at 994.
181. Id. at 996-97.
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ute, the government must show all elements required by the
statute to comprise a violation. The government's case in the
second situation is strengthened by showing a great disparity
in the competing interests at stake.18
The secrecy order is a procedure to limit disclosure based
on a federal statute. Where this prior restraint is subjected to
judicial review, the government must meet the heavy burden
of showing the validity of the restraint. Where the govern-
ment property interest in the invention is supported by a fed-
eral statute, e.g., the Atomic Energy Act or the NASA, the
government's burden to establish the propriety of the restric-
tion is lessened. The presumption of validity which appends
every act of Congress places a limited presumption of validity
on government action taken pursuant to such laws. On the
other hand, where the government property interest in the in-
vention is not supported by a federal statute, as is the case
with civilian cryptography research, the government must
meet a heavy burden of showing that the particular activity it
seeks to restrain is one which Congress subjected to govern-
ment restraint under the statute authorizing a national secur-
ity interest. Where the government can show a "disparity of
risk""' in the various results possible from granting or deny-
ing the restraint, the government has perhaps strengthened its
case. Judicial determination of the existence of a disparity of
risk ideally should be on a case-by-case basis to allow differ-
ences in inventions to aggravate or mitigate possible harms.
III. RELIEF FROM PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS OF THE INVENTION
SECRECY ACT.
The injuries suffered from the issuance of a secrecy order
have been identified in terms of constitutional torts. Constitu-
tional causes of action generally provide a more effective basis
for breaking through the barrier of sovereign immunity. The
inventor must be able to fit his case within the four corners of
a federal statute which allows an individual to sue the federal
government or its agencies for the torts identified. Only two
bases for jurisdiction appear to be available to the inventor
whose right of action under the Invention Secrecy Act has
182. See Hearings, supra note 1, at 242-57 (Prepared Testimony of H. Miles
Foy, Senior Attorney-Advisor, Department of Justice).
183. 467 F. Supp. at 996.
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been denied: The Federal Civil Rights Act and federal ques-
tion jurisdiction.
A. Federal Civil Rights Action.
Recognizing that some valid tort and constitutional
claims were being denied recognition in courts because they
fell either within the discretion exception or the intentional
torts exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 84 the United
States Supreme Court, in Butz v. Economou, 85 acknowledged
the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983186 to suits against federal
officials. The Economou decision settled the split in the lower
federal courts,1 87 and held that a federal official, acting within
"the outer perimeter of [his] line of duty,"188 is entitled to ab-
solute immunity from common law torts, but for constitu-
tional torts the court may look to both the statutory scope of
his authority and the actual nature of his duties to determine
if he is entitled to either qualified or absolute immunity.'
The Court looked to two elements of a violation to deter-
mine the degree of immunity to which a defendant is entitled:
the scope of the official's duty and the scope of the official's
authority. The rule of Economou is:
the conduct charged must not only be within the scope of
the official's duty, but also within the scope of his author-
184. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a), 2680(h) (1976). The discretion exception is the larg-
est loophole. This exception allows government employees who commit torts while
exercising discretion as required by their duties of employment to be immune from
prosecution.
185. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
186. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be sub-jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
187. Compare Felder v. Daley, 403 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) and J.D.
Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice, 450 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa.
1978) with Norton v. Turner, 427 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Va. 1977) and Briggs v. Good-
win, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
188. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959).
189. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this rule in Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228 (1979). See Comment, Executive Immunity for Constitutional Torts after
Butz v. Economou, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 453 (1980) [hereinafter Executive
Immunity].
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ity for an absolute immunity to arise. When the conduct
is within the scope of duty but without authority, only a
qualified immunity exists. s
The Court stated that "a qualified immunity from damages
liability should be the general rule for an executive official
charged with constitutional violation," 191 but continued its
analysis of various duties, choosing to extend an absolute im-
munity to officials whose duties are "quasi-judicial."" 2
Applying the rule of Economou to the secrecy order situa-
tion, the determinations of a government property interest in
the invention and a government national security interest
within the appropriate federal guidelines are not part of an
administrative agency hearing. Indeed, the lack of an adminis-
trative hearing or adjudication of damages and the lack of
guidelines for determining a national security interest are
harms for which the patent applicant seeks relief. Therefore,
no potential defendants could have performed duties which
the Economou Court would consider sufficiently quasi-judicial
to invoke the protection of absolute immunity. At best, the
official would be able to claim a qualified immunity, which
would lessen his liability for damages.
However, a plaintiff must meet his burden of proof under
Section 1983. He must (1) point to his constitutional rights
which have been violated, (2) show that the defendants were
acting under color of law in so depriving him of these rights,
and (3) show that each defendant knew of or reasonably
should have known that he was acting outside the law. Of
these requirements, the last is perhaps the most difficult to
prove. Although something less than scienter is required, a
commentator has interpreted court decisions to require a
showing of personal blameworthiness 1" rather than that the
deprivation of constitutional rights was the result of the ac-
190. 52 TEMP. L.Q. 102, 115 (1979). This casenote rephrases the Court's lan-
guage in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
191. 438 U.S. at 508.
192. Id., at 508-17. Specifically, the Court states that judges, federal administra-
tive hearing examiners, agency prosecutors, and agency attorneys should be entitled
to absolute immunity to ensure the integrity of federal administrative hearings as
quasi-judicial procedures.
193. Executive Immunity, supra note 189, at 461. M.A. FRANKLIN, INJURIES
AND REMEDIES: TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 672 (2d ed. 1979). Scienter is not re-
quired since the action is in tort rather than for criminal sanctions. But plaintiff must
prove the defendant's state of mind, since the tort is intentional.
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tions of the official being sued. Blameworthiness is even more
difficult to prove in a case where the act, done according to a
statute, has never been successfully challenged for constitu-
tional deficiencies.'" Proof of a defendant's state of mind in a
Section 1983 suit will be difficult because the Act has never
been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds. How-
ever, potential problems involved in successful litigation of a
Section 1983 suit are rendered less foreboding by the availa-
bility of an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.195
This provision for attorney's fees could make Section 1983 a
more attractive basis for jurisdiction, if the blameworthiness
condition can be met.
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction.
An applicant who has suffered constitutional harms due
to a secrecy order issued on his application is entitled to bring
an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1" This statute provides for
jurisdiction of federal district courts in suits against the fed-
eral government, any federal agency, or any employee of the
United States acting in his official capacity for harms arising
under the Constitution or federal statutes. Federal officials
and employees may be able to claim official immunity in a
federal question suit if the district court finds that the federal
employee acted with subjective good faith and with objective
reasonableness. 19 Even if the court finds that the federal em-
ployee acted capriciously or arbitrarily, the federal defendant
may still be entitled to immunity.198
194. M.A. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 684-
86 (2d ed. 1979). Lack of notice to a government official that an action results in
deprivation of constitutional rights can be characterized as "innocent mistake of
law." Whether harm intentionally inflicted, but under an innocent mistake of law, is
covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an open question. The Supreme Court avoided this
issue in Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
One commentator reads Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), as authority for
the view that ignorance of the law is no defense where "objective circumstances indi-
cate that the official knew or should have known that constitutional rights were being
violated." Executive Immunity, supra note 189, at 461 (emphasis added).
195. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. V 1980).
196. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (West Supp. 1979). The 1976 amendment to this
section eliminated the $10,000 jurisdiction amount for federal question suits.
197. Chaudoin v. Atkinson, 406 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. Del. 1975).
198. Id. at 35-36.
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IV. SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS
This article thus far has focused on statutory interpreta-
tion and on recognized causes of action. The article now
projects forward, proposing amendments to the existing law
and rules.19
As the secrecy order laws apply to civilian technology,
which is covered by either the AEA or the NASA, the pre-
sumption of validity that accompanies acts of Congress vali-
dates the current legal mechanisms. The provisions for review,
hearing and compensation are provided for separately in the
AEA 200 and the NASA, 20 1 as well as in the Invention Secrecy
Act. These Congressional acts clearly define the government
interest in the information contained in such patent applica-
tions. The provisions for takings, under the Atomic Energy
Act,20 2 at least, have been held valid in the face of constitu-
tional challenge.20
Where the defense agencies have no statutory property
interest in an invention, procedures should require a deter-
mination of the property status of the invention before a se-
crecy order may issue on it. The problems begin when govern-
ment agencies assert an interest in an invention on the basis
of the national security, because that term is not defined by
an act of Congress. Immediately, the presumption of the va-
lidity of the agency's interest is less than the interest defined
by the AEA or the NASA. The government's burden of prov-
ing a valid national security interest in the information is not
increased proportionately. Where the national security inter-
est claimed by a defense agency on an invention not covered
by the AEA or the NASA is not clearly defined by an act of
Congress, the Patent Office and the defense agencies should
exercise great care to ensure that the individual's property
rights in his application are not violated. The rules regulating
implementation of the secrecy order laws should provide for
determinations of public ownership of inventions on which an
199. The House Committee on Government Information and Individual Rights
held hearings on the patent secrecy order laws during the first half of 1980 with the
intent of amending the existing procedures for implementing the laws. See REPORT,
supra note 1; Hearings, supra note 1.
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181(a) and (b), 5817(d) (1976).
201. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2457, 2458 (1976).
202. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2274(b), 2280 (1976).
203. United States v. The Progressive, 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
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agency wants a secrecy order to issue prior to such issuance.
In particular, the agencies should not treat the inventor's ap-
plication in a manner which would be a taking should a pat-
ent issue. This denies the inventor his due process rights to
claim compensation and review of the agency action.
As discussed previously, the inventor's property rights are
recognizable under a rule analogous to that used in trade se-
cret law, if the idea is reduced to practice, transferable, and
novel.2 0 4 Therefore, rather than resolving the entire issue of
patentability before issuing a secrecy order, the interested
agency should require a resolution of the novelty of the idea
in order to establish the agency's liability to an inventor for
an incautiously issued secrecy order. Where the idea is not
novel, issuance of a secrecy order on it is unsupportable. Such
an idea is not for the government to control because it is al-
ready in the public domain. Where the idea is novel, however,
it is not yet public, and therefore may be controlled. In addi-
tion, government control of the idea is an infringement of the
inventor's rights in the idea, so the agency must be prepared
for a compensation suit if it interferes with these property
rights.
In addition to a determination of the novelty of an inven-
tion, the Patent Office should be required to determine, dur-
ing the first six months after filing, whether an invention con-
cerns patentable subject matter. The case law interpreting the
applicable code sections is extensive and well-developed. Six
months is not an unreasonable limit for this application of
statutory and judicial guidelines. The general rule for subject
matter is that laws of nature are not patentable.2 Laws of
nature are by definition obvious and public. Although an ele-
ment of discovery is inherent in natural laws, the element of
discovery does not make them less public. Clearly, the dual
determinations of patentability of subject matter and novelty
can serve to establish the inventor's property rights in the in-
vention and to foreclose government control of ideas, without
interfering with the statutory goal of protecting the national
security. These two limitations eliminate the most abusive in-
204. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
205. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). See also Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584 (1972) (a method for updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion
processes, in which the only novel feature was a mathematical formula, was held to be
not patentable under § 101 of the Patent Act).
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stances of secrecy order issuance by requiring the government
to recognize a minimum value in the invention before gaining
control of it. The recognized minimum also serves as a base-
line evaluation of the invention that an applicant may use in a
suit to gain compensation for the issuance of the secrecy
order.
Where the defense agencies have no statutory property
interest in an invention, procedure should require approval,
by a neutral magistrate, of the agency's probable national se-
curity interest in the invention before issuance of a secrecy
order. Imposition of criminal penalties for violation of a no-
tice of restriction, issued pursuant to a statute, violates the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. United States
District Court ,2 6 as well as the fourth and fifth amendments,
where the agency has seized information in the patent appli-
cation by mere issuance of a secrecy order notice without hav-
ing satisfied a neutral magistrate that the elements of a crimi-
nal offense are probably present.2 °0 Such a change in
procedure would provide for review of the agency action. This
review would ensure a proper government purpose for impos-
ing restraints. Among the criteria which a magistrate should
require the agency to meet are: (1) a determination of novelty
of the invention, (2) a recognition, by the interested defense
agency, of the value of the information in the application, (3)
identification of the specific national security interests that
might be adversely affected by disclosure of the information
in the application. In camera hearings may be required, since
the identification of the defense agency's interest will proba-
bly involve disclosure of classified information.
This requirement of an ex parte pre-issuance hearing ne-
cessitates a delegation of responsibility for issuance of the se-
crecy order. The Act should expressly delegate responsibility
for the issuance of such orders either to the defense agency,
who must bear the burden of damages, or to the Patent Of-
fice, which currently claims no responsibility, or to both
jointly. Currently, a patent applicant must apply to the de-
fense agency responsible for issuance of the secrecy order for
damages.20 8 Although no responsibility is actually attributed
206. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
207. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, . . ").
208. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181, 184-85 (1976).
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by this procedure, the Act should expressly delegate such re-
sponsibility. This change would end the current finger-point-
ing confronting an applicant who seeks just compensation
damages.
Further, Congress should create guidelines for determin-
ing when the national security is threatened in a patent ap-
plication. Inclusion of such guidelines in the statute would
create tighter boundaries within which the agencies could op-
erate and simplify judicial evaluation of secrecy order cases.
In order to make the Invention Secrecy Act consistent
with the holding of United States v. United States District
Court,109 the Secrecy Order Statute should be more sharply
focused. Where the government has a congressionally deter-
mined property interest in the information, the national se-
curity interest has been identified with sufficient specificity.
Of course this assumes that the laws which grant the property
interest are consistent with the Constitution.
Where the government has no such statutory property in-
terest, the Secrecy Order Statute should expressly require a
national security interest in relation to foreign governments.
The secrecy order should be more closely tied to the concern
with exportation of information expressed in other sections
of the Invention Secrecy Act 21 0 Either the statute or the
rules which regulate enforcement should explicitly exclude
issuance of secrecy orders solely on a domestic security inter-
est. Where the concern is exportation of information, domes-
tic exploitation of the information need not be denied. Con-
trol of the information on a domestic market should not be
tied automatically to licensing information for foreign mar-
kets. Congress has the power to legislate such a tying arrange-
ment but the eminent ,domain provisions of the Constitution
have not given Congress the right to do so. Where the identifi-
able security interest which the government agency seeks to
protect with a secrecy order is a domestic security interest,
the restraints imposed by the secrecy order are improper and
violate the first amendment rights of the inventor.
Congress should amend the Invention Secrecy Act to re-
quire administrative hearings on the issue of propriety of the
agency action as well as on the issue of compensation. Such a
209. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
210. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 182, 184-86 (1976).
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provision would invoke the procedural guarantees of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.211 The APA, in adjudicative hear-
ings, allows written pleadings in most cases, including com-
pensation claims," 2 but requires that such hearings produce a
written record and a decision based on the testimony submit-
ted to the agency and made available to the opposition for
rebuttal. The procedure would be similar to the "paper hear-
ings" held by the Environmental Protection Agency. The op-
tion of a hearing before an administrative judge, however,
would be available before the option of a hearing in the Court
of Claims at the time of issuance of the patent. The resultant
written records would make an in-depth review of the admin-
istrative actions possible. An agency interested in protecting
its position in the compensation hearings will be encouraged
to record both its actions and its reasons for acting in opposi-
tion to the current policy, rather than delaying and concealing
evidence. The openness required by APA procedures would
prevent abusive implementation of the secrecy order
procedures.
V. CONCLUSION
The Invention Secrecy Act was originally drafted to pro-
vide a period of government review of patent applications for
consideration of problems of exportation of information to
foreign markets, especially application for foreign patents.
However, the government defense agencies have used the Act
as a tool for controlling the availability of certain classes of
information within the United States. The government agen-
cies designed rules and procedures for implementing the Act
which inflict constitutional torts on patent applicants. As cur-
rently implemented, the secrecy order laws act as a prior re-
straint on the applicant's first amendment freedom to publish.
Further, this prior restraint has many indicia of a taking of
private property. Therefore, the procedures should be sub-
jected to scrutiny for capricious and arbitrary implementa-
tion. Abusiveness which properly requires compensation is es-
pecially a problem where a secrecy order is issued and then
lifted within weeks or months after its issuance. Many appli-
211. Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237-44 (1946); Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378
(1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976)).
212. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1977).
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cants, however, are denied the right to seek compensation and
so are denied their due process rights. Unfortunately, judicial
interpretations have largely supported current procedures
which deny rights of individuals and favor the agencies. These
interpretations contravene the plain language of the Act.21 3
To cure this denial of rights, the proposals would make
the agency procedures more visible and more subject to review
than they have been in the past. For each secrecy order issued
there should be an agency that takes the responsibility for the
issuance, that obtains prior judicial approval of the restraint,
from whom the applicant may claim damages, and whose de-
cision the applicant may have reviewed.
The time is ripe for amendment of the patent secrecy or-
der laws and procedures. Realizing this, the House Committee
on Government Information and Individual Rights held hear-
ings on the patent secrecy order laws during the first half of
1980 and recommended amendments to the existing proce-
dures for implementing the secrecy order laws. Unless the ba-
sic constitutional problems of the current system are cured,
the government defense agencies will be able to continue to
subvert, to their own purposes, the patent laws which the
Framers of the Constitution intended to benefit the general
public.
213. Of all the secrecy orders initiated during World Wars I and II, before the
Invention Secrecy Act was enacted in 1945, only 29 administrative claims for compen-
sation have been filed with the Department of Defense. Of these, 13 were settled by
the DOD, one was the subject of a Congressional relief bill, 10 were denied, and 5
were pending as of December 1980. REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. In essence then, the
right to compensation is illusory.
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